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 Managing saline groundwater impacts from irrigation - Designing and testing 
emissions trading in Coleambally Irrigation Area  
 
Abstract:  Irrigated agriculture often leads to recharge to local and regional groundwater 
systems greater than what the systems can absorb, resulting in the development of shallow 
watertables causing salinity and waterlogging.  Policy based on emissions trading offers one 
option for effective management of existing recharge externalities if effective property rights 
to diffuse emissions can be defined.  In this paper we combine the conclusions drawn from 
biophysical research with economic principles underpinning emissions trading to present 
such a system.  Allocation of net recharge contracts to irrigation farms will internalize the 
costs associated with saline aquifer impacts. Irrigators may reduce their compliance costs by 
creating or purchasing credits that reduce recharge through perennial vegetation, 
engineering solutions or crop rotation options. We discuss the economic impacts of adopting 
such a policy in the Coleambally Irrigation Area in southwestern New South Wales, 
Australia.  Conclusions drawn from our research are demonstrated using experimental 
economics.   
 
Keywords: salinity, irrigation, recharge, tradable emissions, cap and trade, hydrologic-
economic modelling, experimental economics 
 
1. Introduction 
Irrigation induced salinity is a well known problem in many mature irrigation areas across 
Australia and internationally.  Irrigated agriculture often leads to recharge to the regional 
groundwater systems greater than that which the systems can absorb, resulting in the 
development of shallow watertables causing salinity and waterlogging.  The consequences of 
salinity in irrigation areas include production losses, increased production costs and damage 
to environmental and infrastructure assets.   
 
The Coleambally Irrigation Area (CIA) in south-west New South Wales, Australia (Figure 1) 
is a region experiencing such salinity and waterlogging.  The CIA was developed in the 
1960’s following the completion of Blowering Dam on the Tumut River.  The CIA 
encompasses approximately 79,000 ha of which approximately 97% is developed for 
irrigation.  The CIA has a bulk water entitlement of approximately 629 GL which is diverted 
from the Murrumbidgee River.  The main crops grown in the area include rice, maize, 
soybean, winter cereals, canola, and pastures for livestock.  Prior to irrigation, the watertables 
in the CIA were around 20 meters (Khan et al. 2002).  However, due to recharge to the 
groundwater from inefficient irrigation practices, leaky channels, and recharge from rainfall, a 
significant proportion of the CIA had watertables within 2 meters of the soil surface by the 
late 1990s (Coleambally Irrigation Co-operative Limited 2003).  These have since subsided 
due to recent below average rainfall and reduced water allocations but a return to normal 
seasonal conditions will return high water tables.  
  
A number of instruments have been adopted to address the threat that irrigation induced 
salinity poses to the CIA and other communities.  These have included: regulatory approaches 
that limit areas that can be planted with rice; specifying maximum crop water use; 
identification and sealing of leaky channels; deep groundwater pumping; education and 
training directed towards improving on-farm water use efficiency and net recharge 
management; and direct incentives via a Land and Water Management Plan (LWMP) to 
improve on-farm water management.  Each of these actions has had some success in reducing 
recharge and the incidence of irrigation-induced salinity.  However, no strategy or 
combination to date has been wholly successful in achieving community management.  As a 
consequence there is a significant risk that the area and severity of waterlogging and salinity 
will increase in the CIA if further action is not taken. 
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Figure 1: The Coleambally Irrigation Area 
 
Coleambally Irrigation Area 
 
This paper is the result of research into the exploration and development of tradable recharge 
rights as a tool to manage irrigation induced salinity in the CIA.1  The focus of the research 
was to determine whether an effective emissions trading approach could be developed and the 
likely efficiency gains to the CIA of such an approach compared to other policies for recharge 
management. A tradable emissions concept was investigated because it offers potential 
efficiency, equity, effectiveness and flexibility advantages over current and historical 
recharge management policies. The emissions cap within the framework allocates 
responsibility for individual recharge contributions to the shared groundwater aquifer.  A 
trading framework facilitates flexible adjustment by allowing a differential reduction in 
recharge between farms within the overall cap.  Further flexibility is offered by the potential 
for non-irrigation actions to offset the impacts of irrigated agriculture. 
 
The imposition of an irrigation recharge cap and trade framework would create a number of 
costs and benefits to irrigators through changes to agricultural production, and to the local and 
wider community through protection of infrastructure, biodiversity and reduction in potential 
negative downstream impacts.  The hypotheses explored in this paper are: 
1.  Are the gains from trade accessed by an emissions trading approach sufficient to 
outweigh the costs of changing irrigation management? 
2.  Are the efficiency gains from an emission trading approach superior to alternative 
mechanisms?   
 
There are three goals in this paper.  The first goal is to describe the nature of the necessary 
rights or entitlements to underpin an emissions trading approach. Therefore, a broad overview 
of the important biophysical issues and methodological framework underpinning their 
incorporation into the design of an emissions trading approach is described in the next 
section.  The second goal is to present estimates of the costs and benefits to irrigation farmers.  
These estimates are effectively a threshold value analysis because almost all costs of changing 
management are imposed on irrigation farmers, while benefits accrue to both irrigation 
                                                 
1 The project was funded between 2003 and 2005 as a pilot under The Australian Government, 
National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (NAPSWQ), National Market Based Instruments 
Pilots Program and by The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO).   
  2farmers and the wider community.  If a cap and trade policy generates a net benefit to 
irrigation farmers then the policy would be worthwhile adopting because the additional 
benefits to the wider community would enhance the net benefits of adoption.  Thus, in section 
three an outline of the methodology and assumptions used for the economic analysis is 
presented followed by the resultant cost and benefit estimates for the alternative recharge 
abatement policies in section four, along with some interpretation where necessary.  The third 
goal is to present a brief summary of a series of experiments undertaken to support the 
biophysical and economic design of the emissions trading approach which is the focus in the 
fifth section.  The paper is concluded with some observations on the merit of the approach 
and opportunities for further analysis. 
2. Biophysical  underpinnings  and methodological framework 
2.1. Understanding the biophysical context of recharge emissions trading 
Irrigated agriculture often leads to recharge to regional groundwater systems greater than 
what the natural systems can absorb without increasing the risk of inducing salinity and 
waterlogging problems.  Net recharge to the groundwater system occurs because the 
aggregate water supplied to the soil profile exceeds the evapotranspiration of crops, leaching 
requirements of soils, and water movement within underlying groundwater systems.  The 
management challenge is to limit the net recharge to sustainable levels. That is, to prevent 
water application beyond the evapotranspiration of crops, leaching requirements of soils, and 
water movement within underlying groundwater systems.  
 
Management of net recharge has a number of similarities with other environmental markets 
where the actions of a group of individuals or businesses are degrading a common property 
resource such as an air-shed or waterway (see for example Tietenberg 2006).  Emission 
trading schemes have proved both workable and efficient where the impactors have been of a 
point source nature.  That is, the source and nature of impacts are readily observable and 
measurable, such as pollution discharges from a chimney or drain.  In contrast diffuse net 
recharge from an irrigated paddock to groundwater is not readily observable. 
 
Net recharge is a diffuse source problem to which emission trading approaches have had 
limited application.  Critical to the use of tradable rights instruments is a robust scientific 
knowledge base and a regulatory platform from which to establish the new rights.  For diffuse 
source problems it is difficult to attribute impacts to sources.  The diffuse and spatial and 
temporal variability of impacts combined with differential biophysical responses delivers a 
variable ultimate impact of recharge associated with alternative activities.  However, the 
circumstances of irrigation management and research support in the Coleambally Irrigation 
Area suggested that it was possible to accurately and cost-effectively estimate paddock-scale 
recharge.   
Setting targets for sustainable irrigation management  
Knowledge about the implications of current or ‘business-as-usual’ (BAU) management is 
required in order to set appropriate targets for future irrigation management.  Khan and Rana 
(2005) describe and quantify the vertical and lateral groundwater flows in the CIA on an 
aggregate and sub-regional basis (Figure 2).  Aggregate CIA recharge is estimated to average 
approximately 55,000 ML per year of which the net recharge is approximately 25,000 ML.  
Therefore, to minimize the impacts of salinity from rising watertables, irrigators within the 
CIA need to reduce net recharge by 25,000 ML per year on average.  An alternative way of 
expressing the conclusions of Khan and Rana is that the annual recharge ‘cap’ should be set at 
20,000 ML to 30,000 ML depending on water allocation, irrigation and cropping practices, 
and winter rainfall.   
 
  3The response to recharge is not uniform across the CIA due to variations caused by sub-
regional differences in the biophysical response.  Therefore, sub-regional targets are required 
in order to achieve sustainability.  Five groundwater management zones were identified, each 
of which has different levels of sustainable recharge (Khan et al. 2004) (Figure 2).  For the 
economic analysis, the zones have been reduced to three: North (Zone1), Central (Zones 2 
and 3) and South (Zones 4 and 5).  The average levels of recharge abatement for each zone 
were derived by Khan et al. (2004) for the period March 1999 to February 2002 (Table 1) and 
used to set sub-regional targets.  The average recharge abatement required is 0.28 ML/ha but 
the north zone has a low target (0.06 ML/ha) while the target is highest in the south zone 
(0.49 ML/ha).  
 




Table 1: Estimation of sub-regional recharge abatement  
Period  North  Central  South  Total CIA 
Mar 99 – Feb 00 (ML)  -9 13,641 10,914 24,546 
Mar 00 – Feb 01 (ML)  -709 8,238 16,314 23,843 
Mar 01 -Feb 02 (ML)  5,364 8,713 11,150 25,227 
Average (ML)  1,549 10,197 12,793 24,539 
Average (ML/ha)  0.06 0.28 0.49 0.28 
 
The implications of the sub-regional recharge abatement targets must be applied at the 
individual irrigator scale in order to facilitate individual entitlements and the potential for 
emissions trading.  The SWAGMAN Farm
® model development by Khan and colleagues 
provides that opportunity through estimation of net recharge at the paddock and farm scale 
(Khan et al. 2002, Madden and Prathapar 1999).  SWAGMAN Farm
® is a lumped water and 
salt balance model which integrates agronomic, climatic, irrigation, hydrogeological and 
economic aspects of irrigated agriculture under shallow watertable conditions at a farm scale.  
The SWAGMAN Farm
® model can be used to simulate the effects of growing a certain crop 
mix on shallow watertable and soil salinity or it can compute an optimum mix of crops to 
maximize farm net returns for which the watertable rise (or farm net recharge) and soil 
  4salinity remain within the allowable constraints for given hydro-climatic conditions (Khan et 
al. 2002). 
Estimating the production benefits of sustainable irrigation management 
Taken together Khan et al. (2002) and Khan et al. (2004) provide the basis for setting targets 
and managing recharge in the CIA.  However, in order to evaluate the relative effectiveness of 
an emissions trading approach compared to alternative policy options a clear picture of the 
business-as-usual impacts of future net recharge on the current groundwater surface and 
hence on agricultural productivity is required.   
 
In order to make an estimate of the likely scale of the costs and benefits of changing irrigation 
management in the CIA a number of biophysical assumptions are required to estimate the 
relationship between irrigation productivity and the underpinning biophysical systems.   
Estimation is complicated because of the difficulties in defining the likely damage path that 
would result from continued net recharge, and in particular estimating the area and degree to 
which land within the CIA is subject to waterlogging or salinity in future time periods.   
Therefore, the time-path and extent of future reductions in agricultural production in the 
region due to waterlogging and salinity cannot be estimated with certainty.  Specifically, the 
area of land subject to waterlogging and salinity, and the consequent economic costs may not 
be linearly related to past changes or future estimates (an assumption in our estimates).2  The 
assumptions used in our model are summarized in Table 2 while the productivity implications 
for yield are presented in Table 3 in Section 4. 
Table 2: Assumptions underpinning salinity damage function estimation 
Factor  Definition of assumptions 
Weather  Average rainfall and evapotranspiration were used based on Griffith 
weather data for the years 1962 – 2002. 
Water  supply  Water supply is based on 86% general security allocation. This is the 
average of allocations for the years 1996/97 to 2001/02, a period of 
‘average’ weather. 
Area of soil 
salinisation 
Linear extrapolation of current levels per Marshall et al. (1994) giving: 
Salinity 
(dS/m)  2004  2024 
0-2 85.4  64.5 
2-4 7.8  21.8 
4-8 4.5  7.8 





® yields adjusted by crop salinity thresholds:  
Yr = Yp (1-B (ECe-A)) 
Where: Yr  = relative yield (t/ha) 
   Y p  = potential yield (t/ha) 
   A  = crop salinity threshold value (dS/m) 
                            B  = % reduction in relative yield per increase in soil 
salinity (dS/m) 
  E C e  = average root zone soil salinity (dS/m) 
 
Thresholds and relative yield from: Hanson et al. (1993), ANZECC and 





Waterlogging assumed one year in three for winter crops and every year for 
summer crops (Grieve et al. 1986). Average annual yield losses range from 
1.3% to 13.7% for different crops (Marshall et al. 1994). 
                                                 
2 Estimation of future agricultural production impacts is further complicated by the fact that land 
managers will actively respond to salinity and waterlogging impacts by modifying management 
practices (for example by changing crop types, varieties, rotations) to minimize production losses. 
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3.1. Net benefit estimation 
Consideration of the emissions trading approach to managing waterlogging and salinity is 
predicated on the hypothesis that this approach offers efficiency gains over alternative policy 
instruments which could be used to promote recharge reduction.  Even if each policy led to 
the same level of net recharge, there would be different costs and benefits attributable to 
them.  First, at the farm level, different instruments would lead to the adoption of differing 
farm management practices, with different spatial and temporal characteristics.  Second, each 
policy instrument will generate a different set of costs at the community scale.  These include 
the costs of developing, implementing and enforcing the instruments, and the costs to the 
participants in identifying beneficial actions or means to comply with various directives.   
Also at the community scale, each instrument and attendant changes in farm management 
practices and recharge may lead to different impacts to third parties, such as to downstream 
water users or the environment. 
 
The immediate policy question is in relation to the first group of farm level costs and benefits. 
That is, whether the gains to irrigation farmers from lower salinity and higher yield impacts 
from the imposition of a net recharge cap are sufficient to outweigh the costs of changing 
management practices.  The alternative courses of action are illustrated schematically in 
Figure 3.  Continuing BAU is likely to lead to declining yields and net annual returns to 
irrigators as waterlogging and salinity increasingly impact on production – represented by line 
‘A’.  BAU is contrasted against potential policies intended to avoid future waterlogging and 
salinity.  One potential alternative policy is depicted by line ‘B’ under which net annual 
returns to irrigators are reduced initially (relative to BAU) but maintained into the future by 
removing future waterlogging and salinity damage that would otherwise occur.  The relative 
merits of the alternative policies are compared via a net benefit test that subtracts the BAU 
discounted stream of net annual returns from that generated by the alternative policy, or in 
Figure 3 ‘benefits’ less ‘costs’.     
 
Estimation of the net benefit test is the focus in this section. The analysis is partial as it does 
not consider community costs.  Nevertheless, it provides important information for policy 
makers.  For example, if identified farm benefits outweigh costs, consideration can then turn 
to the question of whether these net benefits would be greater than likely scheme 
administration and irrigator transaction costs.  
Figure 3: Net benefit of controlling recharge 
Net Returns with  
Recharge Cap Net Cost  
20 years 
Net Benefit 
Net Returns with  
“Business as Usual  ” 
Net Returns with  





Net Returns with  




  63.2. Defining the business as usual scenario 
The economic gains from changing recharge management are assessed by comparing the 
economic outcome from continuing BAU against each of the alternatives.  The biophysical 
parameters for the BAU scenario were defined in Table 2.  In order to estimate the economic 
impacts of the BAU scenario we modeled the impacts of these biophysical assumptions across 
the non-uniform response represented by the zones in Figure 2.   
 
The approach taken was to define ten representative farms for each zone (for a total of 30 
representative farms).  The representative farms were selected from a data set of actual farms 
within the region to reflect the variation in soil types and cropping decisions across each zone.  
The total gross margin and recharge for the 10 representative farms for each groundwater 
management zone were aggregated and extrapolated to derive a value for the groundwater 
management zone.  Estimation was undertaken using the economic component of the 
SWAGMAN Farm
® model3 to optimize agricultural production by maximizing the total gross 
margin4 (TGM) for each representative farm with specified crop rotational constraints.   
 
The optimized BAU model delivers aggregate recharge estimates within 5% of Khan et al. 
(2004) and Khan and Rana (2005), albeit with more significant variations for individual 
regions.   Aggregate economic results are very similar to actual cropping decisions for the 
modeled period (3.2% higher than TGM) with the two largest crops being less than 2% 
difference and the largest difference due to opportunistic use of water on dryland pastures at 
the end of irrigation seasons.  The detailed assumptions and validation of the economic model 
underpinning the economics are described in Robinson et al. (2005).   
3.3. Alternative policies 
There are a number of policy options available to assist in managing net recharge, including 
the emissions trading approach.  Policies impact on recharge via cropping decisions of 
landholders.  Each crop has varying levels of recharge to groundwater, which is influenced 
mainly by soil type, volume of irrigation water applied, and depth to watertables.  Some 
crops, particularly rice, are generally recharging crops, whereas winter crops and perennial 
pastures are generally discharging crops.  Policy selection is founded on generating the 
greatest net benefit to the community.  Effective policy selection is therefore predicated on 
the accurate estimation of relative benefits arising from alternative courses of action.   
 
Four alternatives to continuing BAU were defined: 
1.  Rice ‘cap’: Paddy rice is the main crop generating recharge in the CIA.  Imposing a 
non-tradable rice area quota extends the existing rice policy which limits the area of 
rice that can be grown in the CIA.  The total gross margin is estimated by re-
optimizing farm crop mixes with the rice cap constraint in place.  Water released 
from rice cropping is used for other crops or sold outside of the CIA at a 
representative price for recent years.  
2.  Water ‘cap’: Similar to the rice area cap but has the flexibility of no restrictions on 
any particular crop.  Estimation is similar to the rice cap but water becomes the 
limiting factor and water removed from cropping cannot be sold. 
3.  Recharge cap without trade: Under this scenario an individual farm recharge ‘cap’ 
is imposed consistent with the recharge target for the zone.  The farm recharge ‘cap’ 
must be met through on-farm recharge abatement such as the changing of crop mix or 
reducing cropped areas (any surplus water can be sold).   
                                                 
3 All modeling carried out using SWAGMAN Farm version 3.1, 2000, © CSIRO Land and Water. 
4 TGM is used as a proxy for the profits or net returns to landholders.  It represents the net return to the 
landholder for an activity (crop) before the fixed costs of managing a farm are taken into account.   
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4.  Recharge cap-and-trade: The recharge cap is imposed across a combined model of 
the 10 representative farms for each zone. That is, the inputs of the 10 farms are 
treated as one farm and resources put to the best use across the combined entity.  The 
reallocation of resources between farms within the combined entity represents the 
optimal allocation of resources following trade under emissions trading.   
 
The policy options are designed to reflect the differences between command and control 
policies and incentive based policies.  Hence, options 1 and 2 are designed to represent 
command and control input caps and do not incorporate any flexibility in the way in which 
farmers can respond.  Alternatively, options 3 and 4 are output-based policies with on-farm 
flexibility to change cropping mixes and practices allowed under option 3, and cross-farm 
flexibility allowed under option 4.  The economic basis and estimation procedure for each 
policy is defined in Figure 4.  Moral suasion and communication / extension were not 
analyzed in isolation because they have not achieved net recharge targets to date.  However, 
moral suasion and extension may form important components in the implementation of any of 
the assessed options.  Engineering options such as groundwater pumping are not considered.  
This is due to the relatively high cost of drainage disposal since shallow groundwater is too 
saline for use for irrigation purposes. 
4.  Results and discussion 
4.1. Policy outcomes 
The results of continuing BAU are summarized in Table 3.  The results indicate that 
increasing salinity is projected to reduce the TGM generated by agriculture within the CIA by 
$3m annually from nearly $35m to nearly $32m over the next twenty years or by 
approximately 8.5%. 








usual TGM in 
year 1 
Business as usual 
TGM in year 20 
 
Rice 22,962  $22,331,796  $20,963,969 
Maize 8,610  $6,288,075  $5,321,358 
Soybeans 252  $126,775  $119,392 
Lucerne 539  $402,987 $374,177 
Wheat 17,887  $3,744,294 $3,338,334 
Canola 736  $175,039  $162,075 
Pasture 0  $0  $0 
Dry pasture  16,931  $1,272,663  $1,080,526 
Dry wheat  9,689  $578,038  $573,455 
Fallow 8,589     
TOTAL   $34,919,667  $31,933,285 
Note: Salinity is predicted to impact on margins rather than area planted (see Robinson et al. 2005). 
 
The projected economic outcome under each of the recharge management options compared 
to BAU is summarized in Table 4 with details on cropping decisions under each option in 
Appendix 1.  The constraints imposed through these policies were designed to successfully 
manage recharge within sustainable levels thus avoiding future increases to waterlogging and 
salinity and the resultant production impacts.  Therefore the estimated TGM under each 
policy scenario is expected to be maintained each year throughout the 20 year modeled 
period.  For example, imposing a recharge cap without trade is estimated to generate a TGM 
of $33.4m each year. 
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Figure 4: Policy options for economic modelling was undertaken 
 




Open access (current rice area 
quota continues) 
Estimate a farm model for 10 representative farms in each 
zone. Aggregate and extrapolate to total. 
Yield decline in response to 
increasing salinity. 
1.  Rice ‘cap’  Input cap on most damaging crop – 
rice production 
As for 1. but reduce rice area proportionately until target 
recharge achieved.  Water can be shifted to alternative 
crops or sold out of area.   
No further yield decline. 
2.  Water ‘cap’  Input cap on most damaging input – 
irrigation water  
As for 1. but water inputs proportionately reduced until target 
recharge achieved.  No compensation for lost water (that is 
no water sales). 
No further yield decline. 
3.    Recharge  cap  and
no trade 
Cap on net recharge at the farm 
scale but no trading allowed –
regulation. 
As for 1. but regional targets proportionately applied to 
recharge at the farm scale.  Water can be sold out of area at 
average historic prices (no water purchases). 
No further yield decline. 
4. Recharge  cap-
and-trade 
Cap on net recharge with trade 
allowed.  
Model treats the 10 representative farms as one farm and 
optimizes.  Water can be sold as per 4. 
No further yield decline. 
 
  
Implementing a rice cap (equivalent to a 30% reduction from current maximum allowable area) is 
estimated to reduce the current annual TGM from agricultural production to $33.5 million per year.  At 
this level, TGM under this policy will be lower in the early years than under the BAU scenario, but 
through reducing the rate of groundwater rise and reducing yield losses, TGM will be higher in later 
years. Clearly the merits of the policy will rest on these later gains being greater than the reductions in 
income in the early years. 
 
Each of the policy options without trade is estimated to yield a negative net present value to irrigators.  
These policies should not be considered for adoption unless there are significant non-production net 
benefits that have not been included within the analysis.  For example, the ‘Rice cap’ policy generates a 
negative net present value (NPV) of $2.8 million (at a 5% discount rate).   
 
In contrast the implementation of a zero net recharge cap per farm in combination with trading of 
recharge credits is estimated to generate a NPV of $3.4 million (over 20 years at 5%).   Sensitivity 
analysis of the discount rate between 2.5 and 10 percent indicates that positive net benefits would still be 
realized. 
Table 4: Economic impact of recharge abatement policies 
  Rice cap  Water cap  Recharge cap - 
no trade 
Recharge cap 
- with trade 
TGM/year $33,484,357  $24,795,853 $33,427,573 $33,973,879 
Difference from 
BAU (over 20 years)  $844,622 -$181,613,973 -$347,853 $11,124,586 
NPV of difference 
from BAU  -$2,845,326 -$114,241,969 -$3,573,369 $3,430,911 
4.2. Discussion 
The water cap proved to have the greatest impact on farm profitability.  This is a reflection of the 
influence of water as a key limiting resource in agricultural production in the region5.  It is also an 
indicator of the relative inefficiency of a broad-based input cap relative to a targeted input cap.  Model 
estimates also show that a well-targeted input cap can perform similarly to an output cap without trade 
where alternative, low opportunity cost abatement options are available (rice cap versus recharge cap 
without trade).  This is a particularly important conclusion for policy design because it indicates that 
where trades are not available, or cannot be facilitated, a well-targeted input cap may achieve similar 
levels of efficiency to an output cap. 
 
The additional benefits captured by the cap-and-trade model reflect the fact that not all profitable 
resource reallocations that result from capping recharge can be captured on-farm due to the differential 
opportunity costs between farmers.  In the case of the economic modeling presented in this paper, these 
differential opportunity costs are driven by differences in resource allocation.  However, based on 
experience in other markets we can anticipate that there will also be differences in opportunity costs that 
are driven by variation in the direct costs of production as well as factors including farming skills and 
social preferences.  Hence, the potential benefits generated under a cap-and-trade policy are likely to be 
underestimated.   
4.3. Sensitivity analysis and caveats 
There are a number of factors and assumptions within the model at the farm production scale and at the 
community scale that may impact on the validity of the initial conclusions drawn from the modelling.  In 
several cases additional sensitivity analysis was undertaken to determine the likely implications of these 
factors on the conclusions. 
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5 Removal of income from water sales also influences this outcome  
Farm production scale sensitivity analysis and caveats 
Opportunity cost of water and farm management decisions: Alternative assumptions as to the opportunity 
cost of water would alter the financial attractiveness of alternative crop and irrigation mixes and 
consequent cost of achieving a net recharge cap within the CIA.  At high water prices sufficient water 
may be sold out of the CIA such that recharge targets would be met.  A threshold analysis identified that 
at a price of $78/ML sufficient water would be sold beyond the CIA (in the absence of restrictions on 
water trade) to meet net recharge targets.  Given that water prices have ranged between $55 and $115 per 
ML on average over recent years, removing trade restrictions alone may impact significantly on net 
recharge.  
 
Production costs or losses from soil salinity: The viability of any net recharge policy is largely dependant 
on the assumptions of production losses in the BAU scenario due to soil salinisation.  The viability of the 
emissions trading approach was found to be sensitive to the baseline soil salinity estimates assumed.  A 
threshold analysis indicated that if actual soil salinity production impacts were 10% lower than assumed, 
then the tradable recharge credits policy would return a negative NPV.  Equivalent reductions in impact 
could be achieved by landholders strategically managing crop rotations to reduce salinity impacts due to 
differential impacts between alternative crop options. 
 
The impact of waterlogging in addition to salinity impacts: Soil salinisation is often (but not always) 
preceded by periods of waterlogging.  Management changes that lead to reduced salinity also reduce the 
likelihood of prolonged periods of water logging and consequent production losses.  Additional analysis 
was undertaken in the southern part of the CIA, which is the most affected by salinity.  The analysis 
focused on the impact of including the additional costs of waterlogging along with the soil salinisation 
estimates within the cap-and-trade scenario.  Findings indicate that the additional production benefits of 
reduced waterlogging are substantial and may be sufficient to more than double the total net benefits 
across the region to $8.7m in the southern CIA (compared to $2.8m for the cap-and-trade strategy).6 
 
The impact of requiring additional recharge mitigation in order to reduce the potential damage of 
episodic climatic events: Episodic rainfall events may be sufficient to cause a substantial impact on 
waterlogging and soil salinity if there is insufficient capacity within the groundwater system to absorb 
the above average levels of recharge.  Additional analysis focused on the cost of further reducing net 
recharge in order to create sufficient additional aquifer space to manage episodic events.  When modeled 
in combination with the waterlogging sensitivity analysis the NPV increased by only $3.4m in the 
southern CIA, that is, NPV is $4.3m less than the combined salinity and waterlogging analysis.7 
 
The scope for additional gains from trade resulting from banking and borrowing of recharge credits: The 
additional gains from trade that could be sourced from allowing the equivalent of inter-year trading 
through on-farm banking and borrowing were assessed by considering the impact of dryer years at the 
25
th percentile and wetter years at the 75
th percentile of rainfall.  Allocation levels will be variable over 
this time-frame based on predicted average supply levels for these categories of years.  We found 
insufficient variation in year-to-year returns to drive banking and borrowing of credits and thus estimate 
no additional gains from trade. 
 
Other farm scale factors that were not estimated but which may impact on the scale of benefits from 
implementing a cap-and-trade policy include: 
•  Once-off costs associated with changing management (including costs of shifting resources away 
from farming or outside of the region); and  
•  Differences in opportunity costs that are driven by variation in factors outside of the direct costs 
of production such as farm goals and social preferences.   
 
                                                 
6 Note that the proportionate difference in the central and northern regions would be much smaller due to the deeper 
initial water table.  Nevertheless, the increased costs of waterlogging are likely to increase the net benefits of net 
recharge trading to more than 25% of annual gross margins. 
7 The proportionate difference in the central and northern regions would be much smaller due to the smaller 
reduction required. 
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Community scale sensitivity analysis and caveats 
Two important issues emerge at the community scale referring to the benefits and costs of designing and 
implementing a cap-and-trade mechanism.  First, the benefit estimates for each policy option are an 
underestimate of the total benefits that would be derived from reducing recharge.  This is because they do 
not include estimates of the public and private benefits to the wider community from recharge abatement.  
These benefits include those generated by reduced damage to native vegetation and wetlands in the 
region, reduced damage to infrastructure such as houses and other buildings, roads, drains and supply 
channels, and avoided downstream impacts. 
 
Second, the cost estimates do not include any policy costs.  These include the costs of designing, 
implementing and enforcing the policy and the ongoing ‘administrative’ costs to participants under the 
policy.  For the cap-and-trade model these latter costs include transaction costs associated with trading 
recharge credits.  The significance of policy costs was considered through a threshold value approach. It 
was estimated that policy costs would have to average less than $268,000 per year for the cap-and-trade 
policy to yield a net benefit using the baseline economic analysis. 
 
5.  Experiments to support recharge emissions trading 
Experimental economics techniques were employed to inform a number of outstanding issues relating to 
the design and implementation of a cap-and-trade policy.  Experimental economics involves creating a 
calibrated environment where various incentives and rule combinations can be tested and evaluated.  In 
the case of the CIA the experimental environment is context specific and is calibrated against model farm 
data from the region, as are the experimental treatments.  The experimental environment involved a 
computer based simulation game based on the modelled farms used for the economic modelling.   
Specifically, experimental economic game was used to: 
1.  Test the significance of identified market impediments in a setting calibrated to represent 
important economic and biophysical features of the actual CIA; 
2.  Test behavioral responses to longer term policy options that may require changes to current 
institutional structures; and 
3.  Inform and pre-test on-ground solutions to support policy consideration. 
 
Experiments were undertaken with university students and irrigators and full details are available in 
Ward (2004, 2005) and Whitten et al. (2005). 
5.1. Experimental treatments and setting 
The baseline and experimental treatments employed are summarised in Figure 5.  The baseline treatment 
(treatment one) was designed to represent the status quo: farmers make decisions with little information 
about their impact on recharge; there are no binding recharge allocations or opportunities to trade 
allocations; losses due to rising water tables are shared among all farmers in the catchment; and losses 
are not known in the short run.  In this scenario, there is little incentive for individuals to limit their 
contribution to recharge, as the benefits in the form of increased income are private while the subsequent 
crop losses are shared.  The problem of excess recharge cannot be solved by a single farmer acting alone.  
 
Treatments two and three provided the participants with increased information.  In treatment two they are 
informed how their decisions impact on total recharge, based on data from the SWAGMAN Farm
® 
model.  In treatment three participants also learn how much income they stand to lose due to excessive 
recharge at the end of each period rather than at the end of the experiment.  Each experimental decision 
period represents the choice of annual farm management regime. By examining the effect of information 
alone, it is also possible to distinguish the effects of the institutions used in subsequent treatments from 
the information that must be provided with them.   
 
In treatment four, participants were provided with the same information as in treatment three and 
allocated a farm specific quantum of a theoretical recharge cap, correlated with a zero water table rise.  
Before each period participants were formally brought together to discuss and develop a voluntary social 
compact to coordinate farm management decisions.  As the Coleambally catchment is characterised by 
recharge differentiation, the recharge allocation of an experimental farm reflects actual groundwater 
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impacts of crop mix decisions.  Communication is sometimes very effective in such situations, but other 
times not.  It tends to be less effective where those involved face different costs and benefits from 
cooperation.  The communication treatment follows the experimental observations of Poe et al. (2004) 
and Tisdell et al. (2004). The introduction of non-pecuniary sanctions recommended by Ostrom et al. 
(1992) were not included in the experimental design.  
Figure 5: Summary of experimental design 




















































1  Control  8  8  8  9  8  End of 
session  2 
2  Recharge info  9  8  8  9  8  End of 
session  2 
3  Info + crop 
loss  9  8  8  9  8  Each 
round  2 
4  Communicate  9  8  9  9  8  Each 
round  2 
5  Market  9  9  8  9  8  Each 
round  2 
6  Market + 
communicate  9  9  9  9  8  Each 





9  8  9  8  9  Each 
round  2 
 
Treatment five consisted of information plus a single call market for trading recharge allocations each 
period.  A recharge trading mechanism can provide an alternative means of coordinating individual 
decisions to ensure that overall recharge targets are not exceeded.  Treatment six combined the market 
with the communication treatments, providing a formal discussion forum before each period.   
 
Under all these institutions, the costs reduced crop yields resulting from non-compliance are shared 
among all farms due to the shared groundwater system.  Therefore individual farmers may still be 
tempted to free ride.  An alternative would be to create an individual incentive for compliance with 
recharge targets.  Treatment seven combined the information and market treatments, but with the 
individual rather than the group being penalised for non-compliance with individual recharge targets.   
Experimental setting 
A simulated catchment was constructed comprising twelve geographically dispersed model farms based 
on those used in the economic model.  For each model farm there were five management options, 
representing different mixes of crops.  Farm performance data was determined using SWAGMAN 
Farm
®.  Experimental participants were told they were playing the role of a farmer, and the nature of the 
recharge problem was explained.  Participants were randomly assigned to a model farm, and in each 
period of the experiment were asked to choose one of five management options.  In the baseline 
treatment they were given a table showing the income produced by each option.  In subsequent 
treatments they were provided with more information about the amount of recharge produced by each 
option.  In the market treatments, they were also informed of the marginal value of a recharge unit and 
the increase in income for each additional unit of recharge.    
 
Three experimental phases were undertaken.  The simulated catchment and model farms were initially 
field trialed with irrigators and Coleambally Irrigation Staff.  Following refinements student experiments 
were undertaken.  A simulation trial was held with irrigators at the completion of the student experiments 
for comparative purposes.  The revelation of additional information meant the simulation trial was not 
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compatible with the controls of the student experimental setting, precluding formal statistical comparison 
between the student and field settings. Full details on the experimental procedure, tests and conclusions 
are provided in Ward (2005) and Whitten et al. (2005).8 
5.2. Experimental economics results 
Experimental results were broadly as expected according to theory with the structured provision of 
information, provision of communication forum, introduction of a trading institution, and individualized 
penalties achieving reductions in net recharge.  Overall levels of recharge were highest in the baseline 
and information only treatments (Figure 6, Treatments 1-3).  The coordinating institutions, 
communication and market (treatments 4-5), were associated with a significant decrease in overall 
recharge.  Combining the market and communication treatments reduced recharge still further 
(Treatment 6), and introducing individual penalties for non-compliance (Treatment 7) was associated 
with the lowest level of recharge, in this case below the target threshold of a zero watertable rise.  A 
summary of the statistical results is provided in Appendix 2. 


























water table rise 
Zero water 
table rise 
 a,b  b            a,c            d           c,d         e        e 
Notes: Statistical results shown in Appendix 2; error bars show ±5% of treatment mean, 95% CI; and bars with the 
same letter are not significantly different at the 5% level.   
 
Observed levels of aggregate crop loss and player income were consistent with the recharge outcomes.  
In the individual non-compliance penalty and market-communication treatments crop loss was low and 
income consequentially high.  Compared to treatments 6 and 7, crop loss and consequent reductions in 
income, were significantly higher in the market only and communication only treatments, and higher still 
in the information only treatments (p<0.05).  Crop loss was significantly lower when experimental 
subjects were provided with crop loss information after each period compared to the provision of crop 
losses at the end of the 10 period session.  Results from the simulation trial broadly reflected those in the 
laboratory setting.   
 
An important conclusion from the experiments is the small quantities actually traded, compared to the 
407 units predicted when players act as profit maximising agents acting optimally to available 
information (Figure 7).  Quantities traded were significantly higher in the market and communication 
treatment than with the market only (p<0.05).  The market and individual penalty treatment resulted in 
another significant increase in trade quantity.  Gains from trade followed the same pattern, increasing 
from treatment five to six to seven, but still falling well short of the level predicted by the model.  This 
finding is consistent with real world experience such as those cited by Tietenberg (2006).  Overall gains 
from trade were tiny compared to overall income.  Even in the treatment with the most active market 
(Treatment 7), gains from trade still made up only around 1% of total farm income.   
                                                 
8 The experimental setting was built using the MWATER experimental software platform developed and 
administered by Dr. John Tisdell.  Instructions and details available upon request (j.ward@csiro.au). 
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Figure 7: Quantity of recharge units traded by treatment. 
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Notes:   Error bars show ±5% of treatment mean, 95% CI, statistical results in Appendix 2. 
 
The small number of recharge units traded in the experiments, with very low transaction costs from 
trade, casts significant doubt on the ability of an emissions market to deliver the estimated gains from 
trade in a single annual trading situation in the Coleambally Irrigation Area.  Furthermore, irrigator 
attitudes at the simulation trial revealed high levels of scepticism towards market exchange of recharge 
units and the reliability of data interpretation contingent on the simplified decision making environment.  
However, these findings are tempered by those drawn from a set of farm level case studies reported in 
Whitten et al. (2005), who found individual landholders more responsive to the concept of a recharge cap 
and potential benefits of trade.     
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we report an investigation of the suitability of an emissions trading approach for managing 
salinity and waterlogging in the CIA.  The concept of the cap-and-trade approach is sound but a number 
of important issues needed to be overcome in order for the application to be both practical and efficient.  
These were: 
•  The effective conversion of diffuse irrigation recharge to a point source for which a ‘cap’ can be 
identified and administered via measurement of farm scale recharge; and 
•  Assessment of the efficiency of the emissions trading approach compared to alternative policy 
approaches. 
 
Conversion of recharge from a diffuse source to a point source was feasible.  It comprises two elements: 
an aggregate recharge target; and a measurable individual application of the target.  The overall cap or 
aggregate recharge target in the CIA was modelled by Khan et al. (2004).  Groundwater movements are 
not uniform across the landscape and sub-caps would need to be applied across a number of zones to 
avoid the problem of overall targets being achieved while some areas experience ongoing and perhaps 
worsening damage.   
 
Application of the aggregate target at the individual level is reliant on mechanisms that allow paddock 
scale recharge to be accurately and cost-effectively estimated.  In the CIA, the SWAGMAN Farm
® 
model has been calibrated to provide an accurate and repeatable framework for estimating paddock scale 
recharge and thus provides a suitable metric to act as the basis for the rights or entitlements necessary to 
underpin emissions trading.   
 
The estimates of the relative efficiency of an emissions trading approach when compared to alternative 
policies also provide encouragement.  Economic modelling showed that an emissions trading approach 
was superior in terms of efficiency when compared against a range of alternative policy options that have 
been under consideration at various times.  These estimates are limited to the on-farm costs and benefits 
of recharge management in a restricted setting, and proved robust to a number of sensitivity tests.  Model 
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results do not include the benefits of recharge reduction to infrastructure, and non-monetary 
environmental benefits within and beyond the Coleambally community.  On the other hand, transaction 
costs associated with designing, implementing and running a cap-and-trade model were not incorporated 
into the economic analysis.   
 
The major caveat is that the future benefits of a cap-and-trade approach compared to BAU are small at 
approximately ten percent of current annual income (at a five percent discount rate).  That is, the annual 
benefits are on average less than one percent of annual income.  These small benefits are primarily the 
result of the relatively small impact that salinity was predicted to have on overall yields and the initial 
production loss required to secure future benefits.  If the damage resulting from salinity and related 
impacts is found to be larger, through for example ongoing research into issues such as the costs of 
waterlogging and implications of episodic climatic events, then the costs and benefits should be 
reassessed, particularly in the case of waterlogging.  Similarly, our results indicate that an emissions 
trading approach may be very attractive in areas experiencing more severe salinity impacts. 
 
The positive NPV of the emissions trading approach is reliant on the gains from trade that a cap-and-
trade model allows access to in comparison with alternative recharge management options.  Experimental 
economics was employed to assess the relative efficiency of alternative institutional structures in 
accessing these gains.  The efficiency conclusions from the economic modelling were confirmed using 
an experimental economics approach.  However, the gains from trade are a very small proportion of farm 
gross margins and less than half of the available gains from trade were accessed in the experimental 
setting, though the structure did employ a single trading period.   
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Appendix 1: Detailed estimates for cropping areas and potential total gross margin for alternative policies. 
 
Rice Cap  Water Cap  Recharge Cap – 
No Trade 
Recharge Cap – 
With Trade 
Crop 
Area (ha)  TGM  Area (ha)  TGM  Area (ha)  TGM  Area (ha)  TGM 
rice      16,318  $15,870,489 15,249  $14,830,842 18,902 $18,383,856 18,031 $17,536,368
maize      8,534  $6,232,740 8,604  $6,284,095 6,906 $5,043,611 8,615 $6,291,753
soybean 252  $126,775 0  $0 336  $169,031 0  $0
lucerne        5,711  $4,266,931 75 $55,713 4,315 $3,224,089 6,665 $4,979,751
wheat        24,902  $5,212,764 1,035 $216,570 18,155 $3,800,387 15,080 $3,156,642
canola    1,324  $314,627 0 $0 4,933  $1,172,568 0  $0
pasture        0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
dry pasture  15,120  $1,136,489 17,287  $1,299,377 12,812    $963,036 17,279 $1,298,764
dry wheat  5,423  $323,542 35,356  $2,109,255 11,248    $670,995 11,911 $710,602
fallow      8,612 $0 8,589 $0 8,589 $0 8,615  $0
TOTAL      $33,484,357   $24,795,853 $33,427,573 $33,973,879
Appendix 2: Summary of statistical results (ANOVA) from economics experiments 
 
Total groundwater recharge
a  Quantity traded
b  Market price
c  Treatment  N 
Mean  Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error Mean  Std. 
Deviation 




Control         20  2189.15  a,b  229.927 51.413
Recharge info  20  2349.20  b  202.105       45.192
Info + crop loss  20  2122.15  a,c  170.505       38.126
Communicate           20  1839.15  d  183.209 40.966
Market        20  1914.30  c,d  244.400  54.649    65.20   50.961  11.395  34.90  a 22.671 5.069
Market + communicate  20  1650.30  e    81.036  18.120  147.50  61.844  13.828  50.75  a,b      19.880 4.445
Market + individual non-
compliance 
20  1464.55  e  235.791              52.724 226.45 77.063 17.231  58.00 b     12.354 2.762
Model (target)  10  1610.00  e  0.000  0.000  407.00    0.000    0.000  43.00  a      0.000 0.000
Total                    1911.17   346.809 28.317 183.61 124.939 14.933 47.18  19.397 2.318
Notes: Treatment means with the same letter were not statistically different at α=0.05; post hoc using Dunnett’s T3 post hoc test. 
a  Homogeneity of variance (Levine statistic) p < 0.05; ANOVA coefficients: F (3, 66) = 6.310; p< 0.05. 
b  Homogeneity of variance (Levine statistic) p < 0.05; ANOVA coefficients: F (3, 66) = 38.843; p< 0.05. 
c  Homogeneity of variance (Levine statistic) p < 0.05; ANOVA coefficients: F (3, 66) = 6.310; p< 0.05. 
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